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THE RIGHT TO REFUSE LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL
TREATMENT: NATIONAL TRENDS AND RECENT
CHANGES IN MARYLAND LAW
KAREN E. GOLDMEIER*
INTRODUCTION
Although scientific advancements in recent years have enhanced
the quality of health care for hopelessly and terminally ill patients,
new treatment options also have presented patients, families, and
health care providers with profound legal and ethical dilemmas. The
scope of a guardian's authority to refuse life-sustaining treatment on
behalf of an incompetent patient is one increasingly common ques-
tion that ultimately must be answered independently in each of the
fifty states. Because society is generally ill-prepared to handle the
problems involved with making life and death decisions for others,
courts have been forced into the role of arbiter.
The Maryland Court of Appeals entered into this debate in Mack
v. Mack,' a case in which the wife of a patient who had been in a
persistent vegetative state2 (PVS) for eight years sought, against the
wishes of other family members, to withdraw her husband's medical
treatment.' The court ruled that an individual's views regarding life-
sustaining treatment cannot serve as grounds to supersede statutory
priority for appointment as a guardian4 and that a guardian cannot
* B.S., Cornell University, 1987; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 1993.
The author wishes to thank Professor Diane Hoffmann for her helpful suggestions in the
preparation of this Comment.
1. 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993).
2. The American Academy of Neurology has defined "persistent vegetative state" as "a
form of eyes-open permanent unconsciousness in which the patient has periods of wakeful-
ness and physiologic sleep/wake cycles, but at no time is the patient aware of himself or his
environment." AMERICAN ACADEMY OF NEUROLOGY, POSITION OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
NEUROLOGY ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE CARE AND MANAGEMENT OF THE PERSISTENT VEGETA-
TIVE STATE PATIENT 1 (Apr. 21, 1988). The patient is incapable of voluntary action, and the
few primitive reflexes that may be present are so basic that they require no brain regula-
tion. Id. This condition is a result of "a functioning brain stem, [but] the total loss of
cerebral cortical functioning." Id. It is, however, not terminal, and the patient can remain
in this condition for decades. Id.
3. Mack, 329 Md. at 194, 618 A.2d at 747.
4. Id. at 206, 618 A.2d at 753.
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direct the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for a PVS patient ab-
sent clear and convincing evidence of that patient's wishes.5 Because
the Mack court was forced to make difficult determinations based on a
small foundation of law, the court called for assistance from the legis-
lature to help guide future decisions.6 A few months later, the Gen-
eral Assembly answered this request by passing the Health Care
Decisions Act.
7
The speed with which the legislature moved to address the issues
involved in Mack illustrates the impact and importance of the case.
This Comment explores the issues the Mack case presented by draw-
ing on the small body of controlling Maryland law that existed at the
time the case originated, as well as the legal framework that had
evolved in other jurisdictions. It also analyzes the Health Care Deci-
sions Act in the context of this legal background. Part I of this Com-
ment focuses on court concerns regarding guardianship
determinations in Maryland prior to Mack Part II describes the deci-
sionmaking structure governing life-sustaining treatment issues that
had evolved in other jurisdictions at the time of the Mack ruling. Part
III summarizes the reasoning of the Mack court, and Part IV analyzes
the court's conclusion. Finally, Part V explains Maryland's recent
Health Care Decisions Act and illustrates the influence the Mack deci-
sion had on this important piece of legislation.
I. THE GUARDIANSHIP DETERMINATION
When an incompetent patient is capable of being kept alive in-
definitely through the use of scientific technology, interested parties
are usually unanimous in their treatment decisions and courts are re-
luctant to intervene.8 In Mack, however, a family dispute forced the
5. Id. at 217-22, 618 A.2d at 758-61. The court also decided not to grant full faith and
credit to a guardianship determination established by a Florida court. Id. at 198-203, 618
A.2d at 749-51.
6. Id. at 220, 618 A.2d at 760 ("Methods are available to the Legislature, but not to
this Court, for determining what society currently accepts in regard to the administration
of artificial sustenance to a patient in a persistent vegetative state.").
7. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994).
8. See generally In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987) ("Courts are not the proper
place to resolve the agonizing personal problems that underlie these cases. Our legal sys-
tem cannot replace the more intimate struggle that must be borne by the patient, those
caring for the patient, and those who care about the patient."); see also AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS § 2.73.5, at 122-23 (1992) ("Disputes
regarding a decision to forgo, continue, or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment...
preferably should be resolved without court involvement."); STATE JUSTICE INSTTrUTE,
GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN LIFE-SusTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT
CASES 36-37 (2d ed. 1992) (recommending that trial courts decline to hear these cases
unless parties cannot agree on the patient's actual or probable wishes).
1994] 1307
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Court of Appeals to decide the appropriate course of medical treat-
ment for an incompetent patient.9 Issues in Mack included which
family member should serve as guardian over the ward and whether a
potential guardian's philosophy regarding medical care should play a
role in the guardianship determination.10 Although Maryland law at
the time provided no clear answers to these questions, the statute gov-
erning the appointment of guardians set forth a basic framework:
(a) Priorities.-Persons are entitled to appointment as
guardian of the person according to the following priorities:
(1) A person.., nominated by the disabled person...;
(2) His spouse;
(3) His parents ....
(c) Selection by court.-(1) Among persons with equal pri-
ority the court shall select the one best qualified of those
willing to serve. For good cause, the court may pass over a
person with priority and appoint a person with a lower
priority.1
Before Mack, Maryland judges adhered to the statutory scheme of pri-
ority and rarely dismissed a guardian based on "good cause."' 2 When
they did consider the good cause variable, they looked only to the
personal character and competence of a guardian; substantive law, de-
tails of family disputes, and an individual's personal beliefs were con-
spicuously absent from the analysis.' 3
A. Grounds for Superseding Statutory Priority
Maryland judges focus on the personal character and compe-
tence of the guardian to assure that a guardianship appointment is in
9. See Mack, 329 Md. at 194, 618 A.2d at 747.
10. Id. at 197-98, 618 A.2d at 749.
11. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-707 (1991).
12. Courts had little flexibility to appoint new guardians under the former Code. See
id. § 13-707(c). Delegate Ida Ruben noted the limits on judicial discretion when she intro-
duced the Bill that was eventually codified as §§ 13-705 to -710 of the Estates and Trusts
Article:
[The Bill] clearly spells out the authority and duties of a guardian of the person
and enumerates the order in which prospective guardians are to be chosen ....
Stringent guidelines are set for departmental and court procedures concerning
protective guardianship .... The bases for emergency intervention before full
proceedings can be held are also spelled out and limited.
Hearings on H.B. 381 Before the Dep't of Legislative Reference (1977) (floor statement of Ida
Ruben, delegate).
13. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-707 (1991); see infra notes 14-22 and accom-
panying text.
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the ward's best interest. Only if a court finds that appointing a guard-
ian based on the statutory scheme of priority is not in the ward's best
interest will it supersede the statute by appointing a guardian it con-
siders better qualified. 14 In adoption cases, for example, courts focus
on the ability and interests of contesting parties to provide children
with "love and affection and caring."' 5 In Newkirk v. Newkirk, 6 the
Court of Special Appeals discarded statutory priority because it found
that exceptional circumstances justified awarding custody of teenage
children to a twenty-nine year old half-brother with whom they had
been living and had developed an "excellent relationship." 7 Like-
wise, in In re Adoption No. 09598,18 the court held that inappropriate
conduct by the natural parents made a grant of guardianship to foster
parents in the children's best interest.'9
In property disputes, courts similarly hesitate to uphold grants of
guardianship to individuals who are not conscientious in fulfilling re-
sponsibilities. This principle was demonstrated in Law v. John Hanson
Savings and Loan, Inc.,20 in which, because evidence indicated that a
guardian had issued improper deeds of trust, engaged in usury, and
delayed fulfilling financial responsibilities,2 ' the court threatened to
"act upon its own motion" and dismiss the original grant of guardian-
ship for "good cause shown."22
Although no Maryland court prior to Mack had resolved a guardi-
anship dispute in a medical treatment case, courts in other jurisdic-
tions had confined their focus to the personal attributes of
controverted guardians in this context as well. 2' For example, in Bar-
ber v. Superior Court,24 the California Court of Appeals reasoned that
[the patient's] wife and children were the most obviously ap-
propriate surrogates in this case. They were the people who
14. See supra text accompanying note 11 (outlining the statutory rankings of certain
individuals in guardianship appointments).
15. In rejessica M., 312 Md. 93, 103, 538 A.2d 305, 310 (1988).
16. 73 Md. App. 588, 535 A.2d 947 (1988).
17. Id. at 594, 535 A.2d at 950.
18. 77 Md.App. 511, 551 A.2d 143 (1989).
19. Id. at 519-25, 551 A.2d at 147-49.
20. 42 Md. App. 505, 400 A.2d 1154 (1979).
21. Id. at 512-13, 618 A.2d at 1158.
22. Id. at 514, 440 A.2d at 1159.
23. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ill. 1989) (warning that
.greed may taint the judgment of the surrogate decisionmaker"); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419,
429 (N.J. 1987) (emphasizing the importance of selecting a guardian who cares about the
patient); In re Sylvester, 598 A.2d 76, 84 (Pa. 1991) (emphasizing the importance of the
guardian's trustworthiness in carrying out her responsibilities).
24. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
1994] 1309
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
would be most affected by the decision and were in the best
position to know [his] own feelings and desire[s]. In addi-
tion, there was clear evidence that they were concerned for
his comfort and welfare .... 25
The New Jersey Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in In re
Conroy 6 when it stated that "a determination [to withhold medical
treatment from a mentally impaired individual] necessitates an inquiry
into the guardian's knowledge of the patient and motivations or possi-
ble conflicts of interest."2 7
B. Limits on Guardians in Medical Decisionmaking
Even after appointing a guardian, Maryland courts in the past
have retained authority to play an active role in health-care decision-
making when life is at stake.2" When the Mack case arose, this policy
was evidenced in section 13-708 of the Estates and Trusts Article,
which provided that
where a medical procedure involves, or would involve, a sub-
stantial risk to the life of a disabled person, the court must
authorize a guardian's consent or approval for:
(1) The medical procedure;
(2) Withholding the medical procedure; or
25. Id. at 493 n.2.
26. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
27. Id. at 1241. Consistent with this reasoning, the court offered the following explana-
tion in In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), for its decision
to defer to the decision of the guardian regarding the withdrawal of his daughter's life
support system:
The character and general suitability of Joseph Quinlan as guardian for his
daughter, in ordinary circumstances, could not be doubted. The record bespeaks
the high degree of familial love which pervaded the home ofJoseph Quinlan and
reached out fully to embrace Karen, although she was living elsewhere at the time
of her collapse. The proofs showed him to be deeply religious, imbued with a
morality so sensitive that months of tortured indecision preceded his belated con-
clusion . .. to seek the termination of life-supportive measures sustaining Karen.
A communicant of the Roman Catholic Church, as were other family members,
he first sought solace in private prayer looking with confidence, as he says, to the
Creator, first for the recovery of Karen and then, if that were not possible, for
guidance with respect to the awesome decision confronting him.
Id. at 657.
28. This policy is not always followed in other states, which have laws requiring judicial
intervention only if the interested parties clearly disagree. See Drabick v. Drabick, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 840, 844-45 & n.7 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988).
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(3) Withdrawing the medical procedure that involves, or
would involve, a substantial risk to the life of the disabled
person.29
Moreover, the Court of Appeals made clear its position on the status
and authority of guardians in Kicherer v. Kicherer,30 in which it ex-
plained that "[i] n reality the court is the guardian; an individual who is
given that title is merely an agent or arm of that tribunal in carrying
out its sacred responsibility."3 ' Consistent with this rationale, the
court has appointed guardians while simultaneously denying them the
power to consent to an operation for an incompetent ward. For ex-
ample, in Wentzel v. Montgomey General Hospital,12 the court appointed
guardians for an incompetent thirteen-year-old female, but refused to
allow them to authorize a proposed sterilization procedure."3
C. The Authority of a Guardian to Transfer an Incompetent Patient to a
Health Care Facility in Another Jurisdiction
Before the Health Care Decisions Act, the power of Maryland
courts to deny a guardian's request to move an incompetent patient
across state lines mirrored their power to veto a guardian's health care
decisions. Just as a guardian lacked the authority to make health care
decisions for the ward independent of court supervision, the Estates
and Trusts Article also required "court authorization for any change
in abode."3 4 Thus, guardians could not transfer patients without
29. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRusTs § 13-708(b) (1991) (amended 1992). The statute
also provided:
(b) Nonexclusive enumeration of pemissible powers.-the rights, duties, and powers
which the court may order include, but are not limited to:
(8) The power to give necessary consent or approval for:
(i) Medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment, or service;
(ii) Withholding medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment,
or service; and
(iii) Withdrawing medical or other professional care, counsel, treat-
ment, or service.
Id.
30. 285 Md. 114, 400 A.2d 1097 (1979).
31. Id. at 118, 400 A.2d at 1100.
32. 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983).
33. Id. at 690, 704-05, 447 A.2d at 1247, 1254.
34. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-708(b) (2) (1991). Other relevant sections of
§ 13-708 provided:(a) In general.-The court may grant to a guardian of a person only those
powers necessary to provide for the demonstrated need of the disabled person.
(b) Nonexclusive enumeration of permissible powers.-Subject to subsection
(a) of this section, the rights, duties, and powers which the court may order in-
clude, but are not limited to:
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court approval, and courts had the apparent authority to rule on a
proposed transfer outside the realm of an initial guardianship
determination.
Before Mack, the Maryland patient transfer provision had never
been litigated. In fact, the only reported case involving the right to
move incompetent patients across state lines was In re Busalacchi,s6 a
1991 Missouri Court of Appeals decision. In Busalacchi, the father of a
severely brain-damaged twenty-year-old woman attempted to move his
daughter to a health care facility in Minnesota. 37 As in Mack, oppos-
ing parties alleged that he planned to take advantage of the other
state's more lenient laws governing the right to discontinue life-sus-
taining treatment. 3 The Busalacchi majority focused on the patient's
right to determine her medical treatment and prohibited the transfer
on the basis of the patient's best interest.3 a In support of its decision,
the court emphasized Missouri's policy of "erring on the side of life":40
The issue that is before us is whether a guardian properly
discharges his duties when he attempts to move his ward
from the jurisdiction of the court for the ostensible reason of
avoiding litigation in Missouri where the decision to remove
the feeding tube from his ward may be subject to heightened
legal scrutiny .... Specifically, we will not permit guardian
[sic] to forum shop in an effort to control whether [the pa-
tient] lives or dies.41
The dissent, however, focused on a different issue. Rather than
pinning the determination of whether Mr. Busalacchi could transfer
his daughter based on the patient's "best interest," the dissent pointed
to the rights of a caring parent to guide his daughter's treatment:
"The ultimate question in this case comes down to whether
state employed professionals shall be permitted to substitute
their judgment for that of the parents. No sanction for that
(2) The right to custody of the disabled person and to establish his place of
abode within and without the State, provided there is court authorization for any
change in abode ....
Id. § 13-708.
35. See id.
36. No. 91-59582, 1991 WL 26851 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991).
37. Id. at *1. She had been in this condition for three years. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at *5. The court stated that "[t] he only wall confining Christine in Missouri [was]
that which subjects the guardian to certain minimal restraints to ensure that his decision to
move Christine from Missouri is in her best interest." Id.
40. Id. at *4.
41. Id. at *5.
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type of substitution is granted by the law, unless there is ne-
glect on the part of the parents . . . ." I am unable to con-
clude that Mr. Busalacchi's decision . . . is unreasonable or
constitutes a "failure to supply the minimum quality of care
which the community will tolerate."42
The dissent also stressed the guardian's right to unrestricted
travel throughout the United States and asserted that this right cannot
be constrained because of the purpose of the travel.43 In the dissent's
analysis, the possibility of contradictory court rulings was irrelevant be-
cause when state laws differ, the constitutional right to travel permits
citizens to take advantage of the more favorable law.44
The difference between the approaches of the majority and the
dissent in Busalacchi was the focus on whose individual rights were at
issue. The majority placed exclusive emphasis on the best interest of
the patient. Focusing on an incompetent patient's best interest is an
imperfect approach, however, because it necessarily implicates the
personal values of the courtroom judge. On the other hand, while the
rights of the guardian are easier to ascertain, focusing on them in a
right-to-transfer determination may not adequately address the seri-
ousness of the life or death decision before the court.
II. REMOVAL OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
A. The Law in Other Jurisdictions
During the years following the landmark decision In re Quinlan,45
courts confronted a growing number of issues stemming from an indi-
vidual's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Although the facts of
these cases have differed, a predictable pattern of decisionmaking has
emerged. First, courts recognize both a common law46 and constitu-
tional47 right of competent individuals to refuse medical treatment.48
42. Id. at *8 (Smith,J., dissenting) (quoting In re C.F.B., 497 S.W.2d 831, 837 (Mo. App.
1973)).
43. Id. at *9 (Smith,J., dissenting) ("A state cannot prevent its residents from travelling
to another state to take advantage of the laws of that state.") (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975)).
44. Id.
45. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
46. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) ("IN] o right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or inter-
ference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.") (citation
omitted).
47. See, e.g., id. at 277-78 ("The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from
our prior decisions."); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 585 (D.R.I. 1988) (finding that the
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Second, although states have an interest in preserving life, an individ-
ual's right to refuse treatment can overpower this state interest.49 Fi-
nally, patients do not lose this powerful right should they become
mentally incapacitated; rather, courts attempt to ascertain whether
that patient's right to refuse medical treatment should be asserted on
his or her behalf.5° The patient's preferences or best interests form
the basis of the right to refuse medical treatment. The process of dis-
cerning these prefer-ences or interests is carried out through the two
tests described below.
1. Substituted Judgment Analysis. -Although living wills and dura-
ble powers of attorney are considered the most reliable sources for
discerning an incompetent patient's choice regarding medical treat-
ment,5" an authorized legal document is not always required.5" The
Attorney General of Maryland, for example, has recognized that "to
require a written expression in every case would be unrealistic" 5 and
has suggested that courts accept other evidence in the form of conver-
sations with family, friends, and doctors to determine a patient's pref-
erence.5 4 The patient's previous words and acts, although seemingly
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is "properly grounded in the liberties protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause"); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 633 (recognizing
the right to privacy as "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical
treatment under certain circumstances" even if that decision might lead to death).
48. See, e.g., Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body.").
49. See McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990) (permitting a mentally com-
petent quadriplegic to remove his respirator even though his condition was not terminal
because he "despaired over the prospect of life without the attentive care, companionship
and love of his devoted father" who was dying of cancer). The McKay court wrote:
[A] t some point in the life of a competent adult patient, the present or prospec-
tive quality of life may be so dismal that the right of the individual to refuse treat-
ment or elect a discontinuance of artificial life support must prevail over the
interest of the State in preserving life.
Id. at 624. See also Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 ("[Tlhe State's interest.., weakens... as the
degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a
point at which the individual's rights overcome the State interest."); note 90 and accompa-
nying text.
50. See generally notes 51-93 and accompanying text.
51. See In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (finding that a written document ex-
pressing the patient's wishes was a significant factor supporting the removal of a feeding
tube).
52. See Camp v. White, 510 So. 2d 166 (Ala. 1987) (holding that Alabama's Natural
Death Act did not require physicians to obtain written consent from patients before with-
holding life sustaining procedures).
53. 75 Op. Att'y Gen. 27, 44 (1990) (citations omitted).
54. Id. (citing Karen H. Rothenberg, Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatment: What are the
Legal Limits in an Aging Society?, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 575, 589 (1989)); accord Cruzan v.
1314 [VOL. 53:1306
GUARDIANS' AUTHORITY TO REFUSE TREATMENT
insignificant at the time, provide courts with evidence on which to
determine what the patient's "choice" would be in light of her prog-
nosis.55 The process of weighing this evidence is labeled the substi-
tuted judgment test.5 6
Courts generally apply a stringent "clear and convincing" stan-
dard of proof in substituted-judgment cases involving the withdrawal
or withholding of life-sustaining treatment.5 7 The actual strictness of
the standard, however, varies with the facts of the case. When courts
analyze the "clear and convincing" quality of a patient's previous ex-
pressions, they cannot consider individual statements, incidents, and
other items of proof in a vacuum; rather, they analyze them within the
context of the particular patient's life.5" Regardless of the specific la-
bel a court chooses for the standard of proof, a premium is uniformly
placed on demonstrating responsibility in deciding life and death is-
sues.5 9 As a practical matter, courts tend to focus on a number of
factors that take on varying weights.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289-90 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Few individuals provide explicit oral or written instructions regarding their intent to re-
fuse medical treatment should they become incompetent. States which decline to consider
any evidence other than such instructions may frequently fail to honor a patient's intent.");
In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ill. 1989) ("[A]lthough actual, specific ex-
press intent would be helpful and compelling, the same is not necessary for the exercise of
substituted judgment by a surrogate. .. ").
55. See Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 300 ("[The court should not hesitate to admit any
reliable and relevant evidence if it will aid in judging [the patient's] intent.").
56. See id. at 299-300; Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 720-21
(1984).
57. See 75 Op. Att'y Gen. at 43 (advocating a "clear and convincing" standard of proof
in cases involving the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); see also Rasmussen v. Flem-
ing, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Conn., 553 A.2d 596 (Conn.
1989); In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1984); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947
(Me. 1987); Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 840 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989). But see Drabick v. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting the
"clear and convincing" evidentiary standard), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988). More re-
cent decisions, however, may indicate that the trend may be reversing. See In re Doe, 583
N.E.2d 1263, 1271 (Mass. 1992) (refuting the "clear and convincing" evidentiary stan-
dard), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992); In reL.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 68 (Wis. 1992) ("To
adopt the clear and convincing standard would doom many individuals to a prolonged
vegetative state sustained in a life form by unwanted, perhaps detrimental, means that are
contrary to the person's best interest.").
58. See Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 856 ("[A] n incompetent person's own prior informal
statements [do not] compel either the continuance or cessation of treatment in a particular
case .... In order to determine what weight to assign to [the patient's] prior statements, it
is necessary to put this debate into context.").
59. See Doe, 583 N.E.2d at 1271 (citation omitted). In Doe, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts stated:
We are confident that judges, mindful of the serious consequences following en-
try of [their] orders, will enter such orders only after carefully considering the
evidence and entering specific findings on each factor and then balancing the
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As the number of substituted judgment decisions increases na-
tionwide, the elements of this test have begun to crystalize and clear
trends have emerged. Although the precise definition of "substituted
judgment" may vary slightly by jurisdiction,6 ° the primary characteris-
tic of the test is that it is strictly subjective, respecting the patient's
definition of well-being as well as her interest in self-determination. 6'
The factors courts typically consider in a substituted judgment
analysis generally fit into one of four categories. First, courts routinely
consider statements made by a patient regarding life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment and the context in which they were made. Opportuni-
ties to make such statements frequently arise in the context of one's
job or when one witnesses others who are dependent on life-sus-
taining technology. For example, in McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-
Connecticut," a registered nurse frequently noted before becoming in-
competent that she disapproved of life-sustaining medical treat-
ment.63 She also was adamant that her mother, when dying of cancer,
not receive extraordinary care.' These comments and actions led the
Connecticut Supreme Court to conclude that the incompetent patient
had clearly expressed an intent never to become dependent on life-
sustaining treatment.65 Similarly, in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospi-
tal, Inc.,66 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court discontinued the
various interests. What we require is careful work and reflection on the part of
the judge ....
Id. (citation omitted). Thejudge in Doe demonstrated the extent of this care by refusing to
issue an order until he visited the patient. Id. at 1270. Similarly, in In reVisbeck, 510 A.2d
125 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986), the judge visited the patient to provide "a more careful
articulation of [his] fact finding and reasoning." Id. at 128.
60. Compare Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
431 (Mass. 1977) (defining "substituted judgement" as the choice "which would be made
by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into account the
present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which would neces-
sarily enter into the decision-making process of the competent person") with Morgan v.
Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) ("The decision made should, after considering
the patient's actual interests, preferences, present and future incompetency, be the deci-
sion that would have been made by the patient if competent.").
61. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SuSTAINING
TREATMENT 132-33 (1983) [hereinafter DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SusTAINING TREATMENT].
62. 553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989).
63. Id. at 605.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
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life-sustaining treatment of a fireman and emergency medical techni-
cian who had made similar comments at work.6 7
Implicit in the evaluation of opportunities to express medical
treatment preferences is the consideration of age. Courts are clear
that a patient's young age, and corresponding lack of opportunity to
clearly present one's preferences, does not affect her right to self-de-
termination.6' If the remarks admitted into evidence were solemnly
spoken and the speaker realized the consequences of her words, her
expressed intent is honored.69
Second, a patient's attitude towards her own previous medical
care is considered in the substituted judgment analysis. In In re A.C., 7 °
for example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals remanded a
lower court's decision to prohibit a cesarian section on a terminally ill
pregnant woman because it had insufficiently considered the patient's
previous medical choices. 71 Recognizing that a patient's prior deci-
67. Id. at 631-32, 639-40. Approximately five years before his illness, Brophy received a
medal for helping to rescue a man who received extensive burns in a truck fire and died a
few months later. Id. at 632 n.22. He tossed the commendation in the trash and said, "I
should have been five minutes later." Id. In discussing the accident with his brother, he
said, "If I'm ever like that, just shoot me, pull the plug." Id.
68. See In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) (holding that the right to refuse
medical treatment "rises to the level of a constitutional right which is not lost because of
the incompetence or youth of the patient"); In re Beth, 587 N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1992)
(allowing the removal of life-sustaining treatment for infants under a substituted judgment
analysis); cf In reDoe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass.) (finding that a profoundly retarded woman
in a persistent vegetative state would have chosen to have her life-support system removed),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992).
69. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 326 (Ill. 1989) ("We see no reason why [the]
right of dominion over one's own person should not extend to mature minors."); In re
Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1203 (Me. 1990) (honoring a lower court's determination that the
comments of a teen were spoken in a "serious and deliberate manner" and, therefore,
must be considered valid evidence of a previous determination). The Maryland Attorney
General has stated that the "clear and convincing" level of proof "can be satisfied through
testimony that a mature person had thought about the issue... and had expressed his or
her desires 'forcefully and without wavering' corroborated by testimony that the decision
to forgo treatment reflected that person's values." 75 Op. Att'y Gen. 27, 44 (1990) (quot-
ing McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Conn., 553 A.2d 596, 604-05 (Conn. 1989)).
An issue arising in cases involving younger patients is that because there is generally
less evidence regarding their intent, the few existing pieces of evidence may take on in-
creased significance. See In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987) (finding three clear and
convincing statements by a 22-year-old man to be sufficient); Swann, 569 A.2d at 1205
(holding that because a teenage boy had clearly and convincingly expressed his opinion on
two separate occasions, life-sustaining treatment could be withdrawn).
When the intent of an older patient is at issue, the court may require comparatively
more evidence. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (holding that because no
friends or relatives could testify to the patient's feelings about life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, the evidence was insufficient to support a grant to discontinue treatment).
70. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
71. See id.
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sions regarding medical treatment may reveal related feelings about
life-sustaining treatment, the court urged the lower court to attempt
to find a "discernibly consistent pattern of conduct or of thought."72
When no conclusive evidence exists to indicate a patient's prefer-
ence, a third factor, the patient's general system of values, is consid-
ered in the substituted judgment analysis.73 Courts often rely on the
opinions of people close to the patient to discern these values. In In re
Greenspan,74 for example, a patient's daughter acknowledged that she
never discussed life-support systems with her father, but asserted that
he detested the idea of being incapacitated.75 The patient's wife also
acknowledged never having discussed life-sustaining treatment with
her husband, but agreed that he "would never have wished to live
without full control of his faculties or as a burden to others."76 She
further stated that he told her on numerous occasions that he would
"rather be shot than reside in a nursing home."77 Based on this testi-
mony, the court vacated the lower court's denial of the petition to
discontinue treatment.78
Courts generally consider the tenets of a patient's religion and
the patient's actual religiosity as a component of his or general system
of values. In In re Eichner,79 for example, an eighty-three-year-old for-
mer teacher and resident at a Catholic boarding school expressed
agreement with the view that "Catholic principles permitted the termi-
nation of extraordinary life support systems when there is no reason-
able hope for the patient's recovery." ° In ruling that the patient's
treatment could be discontinued when he entered a persistent vegeta-
tive state,8 1 the court gave great weight to his agreement with these
principles. The court in In reJobes2 also considered religion in a life-
sustaining treatment case.8" In this case, however, religion played a
minimal role because the court found no probative evidence of the
72. Id. at 1250.
73. See generally In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (I11. 989) (espousing
consideration of the patient's values in a substituted judgment analysis).
74. 558 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. 1990).
75. Id. at 1198.
76. Id. at 1197.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1204. The court remanded the case and directed the lower court to apply the
substituted judgment test. See id. at 1205.
79. 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
80. Id. at 68.
81. Id. at 72.
82. 529 A.2d 434 (NJ. 1987).
83. Id. at 443.
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patient's religiosity and her church did not express a position on the
issue of medical decisionmaking 8 4
Courts also consider the actions and general conduct of formerly
competent patients to discern their values. For example, a Delaware
court considered a patient's membership on her state's Euthanasia
Education Council indicative of her view of life-support systems,8 5 and
a New York court recognized a patient's agreement with her sister that
they would refrain from using medical treatment if either of them
were ever hopelessly ill."6 In Gray v. Romero, 7 a New York court de-
scribed a patient's previous lifestyle in detail before allowing with-
drawal of her treatment:
[The patient] was described by all as an active, vibrant and
very happy woman. She jogged regularly, almost daily on a
four mile route near her home by the ocean. She read av-
idly, both fiction and nonfiction, loved classical music, and
continued to play the piano. She spent much of her time
with her children, and she had a special love for her garden.
She is described as somewhat shy, quite thoughtful and deep,
and as very private. She was also described as a proud person
who was meticulous about her appearance and how she
presented to others.... [She] was a healthy and energetic
woman who was rarely, if ever, ill. 8
Based on this evidence, the court concluded that she would prefer to
die rather than live without autonomy and independence.8 9
Finally, a patient's prognosis weighs heavily into the substituted
judgment equation. When a patient's illness is curable, the state's in-
terest in preserving life is substantial; when the affliction is incurable,
however, and much of the patient's "life" already has been drained,
courts are much more willing to grant requests to discontinue treat-
ment.90 In In re Peter,91 for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court
84. Id. at 442-43.
85. In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del. Ch. 1980).
86. Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989).
87. 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988).
88. Id. at 582.
89. Id. at 587-88.
90. Courts justify this policy on the principle that a state's normally compelling interest
in preserving life is weakened "as the degree of bodily intrusion increases and the chance
of recovery wanes." In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 74 (Wis. 1992). The L.W court reasoned
that "[a] t a certain point, treatment serves only to prolong the dying process unnaturally,
and at this point the patient's liberty interest in refusing treatment prevails." Id.; see Bouvia
v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing a mentally astute
quadriplegic to remove the nasogastric tube previously inserted into her body against her
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focused on the "'prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of return to
cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced continu-
ance of... biological vegetative existence.'"92 Combining this analysis
with a subjective analysis focusing on actual proof of the patient's pref-
erence, the court ordered the treatment to cease. 93
2. The Best Interest Test.-When insufficient evidence renders the
application of a substituted judgement test impossible, courts are
placed in the difficult position of deciding how to guard an individ-
ual's right to withdraw treatment without conclusively knowing
whether that individual would choose to exercise this right.94 In these
situations, a number of courts have applied a best interest analysis, in
which the surrogate decisionmaker considers the objective costs and
benefits of treatment without considering the patient's personal views.
The factors involved in the best interest test include:
[T] he patient's present level of physical, sensory, emotional,
and cognitive functioning; the degree of physical pain result-
ing from the medical condition, treatment, and termination
of treatment, respectively; the degree of humiliation, depen-
dence, and loss of dignity probably resulting from the condi-
tion and treatment; the life expectancy and prognosis for
will); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 (Mass. 1986) ("[T]he
State's interest in preserving life is very high . . . 'where the affliction is curable' [and]
wanes when the.. . affliction is incurable. . ."); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (N.J.
1986) ("Medical evidence bearing on the patient's condition, treatment, and prognosis,
like evidence of the patient's wishes, is an essential prerequisite to decisionmaking under
the subjective test."); see also In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (affirming a trial
court's decision to withdraw treatment of a hopelessly ill patient despite scant evidence of
the patient's intent); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987) (permitting a 37-year-old com-
petent patient to die from Lou Gehrig's disease at home and to ignore available hospital
treatment); Jobes, 529 A.2d at 444 (finding it difficult to conceive of a case in which the
state's interest could overpower a patient's right to choose a course of treatment). The
judge in Conroy, who allowed treatment to cease after visiting the patient, subsequently
visited another patient and ordered medical treatment to be given to her because
"[d]espite all of her serious mental and physical problems and her short life-expectancy,"
he noted "a positive quality to [her] life in terms of awareness, responsiveness and minimal
comfort." In reVisbeck, 510 A.2d 125, 133 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
91. 529 A.2d 419 (NJ. 1987).
92. Id. at 424 (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976)).
93. Id. at 424-25.
94. See In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.) (finding it unrealistic to attempt to determine
whether a profoundly retarded, never-competent adult would want to continue life-pro-
longing treatment), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). At least one jurisdiction, however,
has applied the substituted judgment doctrine to authorize the removal of treatment from
persistent vegetative state patients who have never been competent. See In re Beth, 587
N.E.2d 1377 (Miss. 1992) (determining that an infant in a persistent vegetative state would
choose, if competent, to have a "do not resuscitate" notice entered on her medical charts).
1320 [VOL. 53:1306
1994] GuARDIAs' AUTHORITY TO REFUSE TREATMENT 1321
recovery with and without treatment; the various treatment
options; and the risks, side effects, and benefits of each of
those options. 9-
As applied, the best interest test is little more than a stopping
point on a subjective-objective decisionmaking continuum."6 At the
subjective end are unequivocal expressions of individual preference,
such as those provided by living wills and durable powers of attorney.
In the middle of the continuum is the substituted judgment test,
which involves a careful balancing of less concrete evidence of a pa-
tient's intent as well as his or her prognosis. At the objective end is
the best interest test, in which the importance of prognosis escalates
because evidence of individual preference is unavailable. Under this
test, the fact that a patient is in a persistent vegetative state or is termi-
nally ill sometimes has been sufficient to convince a court to discon-
tinue treatment.97 The difficulty in applying this test lies in ensuring
that the "best interest" border of the subjective-objective decisionmak-
ing continuum does not operate to disregard the objective value of
life.
B. Maryland Law
Before Mack and the Health Care Decisions Act, Maryland law
was clear on only one point with respect to decisions involving medi-
95. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (N.J. 1985); see also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741
P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc) (noting the importance of "'the opportunities for
future satisfactions, and the possibility of developing or regaining the capacity for self-
determination'") (quoting DECIDING TO FoREGO LIFE-SusTAINING TREATMrErr, supra note
61, at 32); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 457 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (reciting the Conroy list);
In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 72 (Wis. 1992) (same).
96. See generally Stewart G. Pollock, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes Them and by What
Standards?, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 505, 518-25 (1989).
97. See Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 689 (noting that the patient's best interest would be
served by placing "do not resuscitate" orders on her hospital chart because "the medical
probability that she would ever return to a cognitive sapient state, as distinguished from a
chronic vegetative existence, was virtually non-existent"); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 723
(Ga. 1984) ("Once the diagnosis is made that the infant [or adult] is terminally ill with no
hope of recovery and in a chronic vegetative state with no reasonable possibility of attain-
ing cognitive function, the state has no compelling interest in maintaining life."); In re
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984) ("'[C]ontinued treatment beyond a minimal
level will often not serve the interests of permanently unconscious patients optimally.'")
(quoting DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 61, at 181-83); In re
Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (holding that because the patient
was in a persistent vegetative state, "the guardian could conclude that it was in Hamlin's
best interest to terminate the life support systems"); see also In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing parents of a hopelessly ill infant to discontinue treatment);
In re Lawrence, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991) (permitting parents of an incompetent daughter
in a persistent vegetative state to discontinue treatment).
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cal treatment: a competent adult had a right to refuse medical care.98
Although the Code did not expressly guarantee this right, the princi-
ple of personal autonomy in medical decisionmaking was imbedded
in legislative policy. For example, the Code permitted competent
adults to rely on living wills and powers of attorney to establish instruc-
tions dictating whether and how life-sustaining treatment could be
used should they become incompetent.99 These statutory provisions
demonstrate that even before the passage of the Health Care Deci-
sions Act, the legislature was dedicated to preserving patients' per-
sonal autonomy in medical decisionmaking.
III. MARYLAND'S CHALLENGE: M4ACK V AMACK
A. Background
The controversy in Mack arose after an automobile accident left
Ronald Mack in a persistent vegetative state. °00 The Circuit Court for
Baltimore County appointed Ronald's wife, Deanna, his guardian."0 '
She served in that capacity for close to eight years before learning of
the possibility of terminating her husband's treatment. 1 2 By this
time, Deanna had moved to Florida,"0 3 where previous court decisions
had permitted surrogates to discontinue their wards' life-sustaining
treatment.10 4 Deanna considered moving her husband to Florida in
order to terminate his medical treatment, 1 5 but before she was able
to do so, Ronald's father and sister submitted a complaint to the
98. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977) (upholding a patient's right
of informed consent); Mercy Hosp. v.Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (upholding
the lower court's refusal to appoint a guardian for a competent patient who refused medi-
cal treatment), cert. granted, 304 Md. 47, 497 A.2d 484 (1985), vacated, 306 Md. 556, 510
A.2d 562 (1986).
99. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 to -618 (1994) (codifying the right of a
competent individual to authorize the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures when in-
competent); MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-601 (1991) (granting a power of attorney
the same force as the word of the patient).
100. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 193, 618 A.2d 744, 746-47 (1993).
101. Id., 618 A.2d at 747.
102. Id. at 194, 618 A.2d at 747.
103. Id. at 193, 618 A.2d at 747.
104. See, e.g., In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (ruling that the two living wills the
patient drafted when competent provided clear and convincing evidence of her intent);
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (holding that
court approval was unnecessary to terminate the life support systems of a comatose and
terminally ill individual who had executed a living will). But see Baby Born Without Brain
Dies, But Legal Struggle Will Continue, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 31, 1992, at A14 (reporting the deci-
sion of a Florida trial court to deny permission to parents of an infant born with an incom-
plete brain to declare the child brain dead and donate her organs).
105. Mack, 329 Md. at 194, 618 A.2d at 747.
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United States District Court for the District of Maryland to enjoin De-
anna from taking this course of action.0 6 The court issued a tempo-
rary injunction forbidding the hospital from discharging Ronald. 10 7
Ronald's father then petitioned the Circuit Court of Baltimore
County to obtain guardianship of his son. 0 ' The court reexamined
Deanna's initial appointment and attempted to choose between the
competing candidates for guardian by selecting the family member
whose views most accurately reflected those of the previously compe-
tent patient."° The circuit court weighed the facts and tried to ascer-
tain what Ronald Mack's preference regarding treatment would have
been if he were competent. The Court noted:
Through his father and sister, who desire to hold onto his
life, there is recollection of a Ronald who loved life, who
would hold onto life, and who had thanked his father for
attempting to keep his mother alive at a time she had exper-
ienced a cerebral hemorrhage, even though that probably
would have meant that his mother would have survived only
in a vegetative state. From Deanna Mack, there is recollec-
tion of an incident, when the couple visited Ronald's infirm
grandmother, that he commented he would not want to live
if he could not do for himself. He had also expressed to
Deanna his gratefulness that a friend had died and did not
have to suffer, when that friend had been shot. There was
testimony that Ronald hated hospitals, doctors, medicine,
and confinement. Deanna points to his love of life and
sports as an indication he would not want to live in his pres-
ent unconscious and confined state.110
Applying a "clear and convincing" standard of proof, the trial
court found these facts to be an insufficient basis on which to deter-
mine the patient's preferred course of treatment.1 "'If anything,'"
the court wrote, "'the evidence produces a stalemate."1 2 In appar-
ent recognition of this "stalemate," it refused to apply a best interest
test and granted the petition for guardianship of Ronald Mack's fa-
ther.11 According to the court, the father's intention to continue
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 194-95, 618 A.2d at 747-48.
110. Id. at 195-96, 618 A.2d at 748 (quoting In re Mack, No. 91-T-103, slip op. at 62 (Cir.
Ct. for Baltimore County Mar. 10, 1992 (mem.)).
111. Id. at 196, 618 A.2d at 748.
112. Id. (quoting Mack, No. 91-T-103, slip op. at 63).
113. Id.
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treatment would "'carry into effect the applicable law of Maryland,"'
which the court interpreted as requiring a disabled life to be contin-
ued through the administration of food and water. 1 4 Deanna ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals, which bypassed the intermediate
appellate court and granted certiorari." 5
B. The Guardianship Determination
The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the lower court's
decision to appoint Ronald Mack's father as guardian, but affirmed
the decision to continue Ronald Mack's life-sustaining treatment. 6
Writing for the majority, Judge Rodowsky first rejected the circuit
court's merging of the issues of guardianship and medical care." 7 He
reasoned that the guardianship statute's requirement that a guardian
obtain court approval before transferring an incompetent patient
across state lines" 8 or ordering the withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment indicated that the guardianship issue should be decided sepa-
rately from the medical issue. 1 9 The court then decided that,
because Deanna recognized the need for additional court approval
before she could order the withdrawal of Ronald's life-sustaining treat-
ment, her views neither automatically disqualified her from a guardi-
anship appointment120 nor constituted good cause to overrule her
statutory priority to be appointed guardian. 2'
The court did not, however, automatically grant guardianship to
Deanna. Acknowledging that the "statutory preference in the ap-
pointment of a guardian . .. is always subject to the overriding con-
cern of the best interest of the ward,"122 the court remanded the case
for a full consideration of Deanna's fitness to be guardian. 2 ' In par-
ticular, Judge Rodowsky asserted that the circuit court failed to con-
sider issues such as whether Deanna could fulfill her guardianship
duties and the extent to which the geographical proximity of Ronald
Mack's father tipped the best interest scale in his favor. 124 The court
114. Id. (quoting Mack, No. 91-T-103, slip op. at 1).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 197-98, 618 A.2d at 749.
117. Id. at 204, 618 A.2d at 752.
118. Id. at 206 n.6, 618 A.2d 753 n.6 (citing MD. CODE ANN., Esr. & TRUSTS § 13-
708(b)(2) (1991)).
119. Id. at 205, 618 A.2d at 753 (citing MD. CODE ANN., Esr. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c)
(1991)).
120. Id. at 206, 618 A.2d at 753.
121. See id. at 204, 618 A.2d at 752.
122. Id. at 203, 618 A.2d at 752.
123. Id. at 206, 618 A.2d at 753.
124. Id. at 204, 618 A.2d at 752.
1324 [VOL. 53:1306
GUARDIANs' AUTHORITY TO REFUSE TREATMENT
also noted that although a guardian's views "are not per se disqualify-
ing from appointment as guardian... the court may consider them as
a factor in an overall determination. "125
Judge Chasanow dissented from the majority's guardianship de-
termination. First, he asserted that the trial judge's decision should
not have been disturbed unless it was "clearly erroneous" or "an abuse
of discretion." 126 He then distinguished Deanna's "views" about her
husband's treatment from her "intent" and "apparent ability" to act
on her views by removing the gastronomy tube. 12 7 Because he main-
tained that her intent and apparent ability to remove the treatment
was an appropriate consideration in the lower court's good cause anal-
ysis, he would have upheld the lower court's decision to grant guardi-
anship to Ronald Mack's father.1 28 Finally, Judge Chasanow argued
that additional factors relating to Deanna's fitness to be guardian,
such as "whether [she] could or would fulfill the duties of guardian-
ship," did not need to be addressed because, as a matter of law, they
could only favor Ronald's father.1 29
C. The Right to Refuse Treatment
After resolving the issue of guardianship, the court turned to
Ronald Mack's right to refuse medical care. Following the traditional
pattern established by courts deciding similar cases, the majority first
recognized the right of competent adults to refuse medical treat-
ment. 30 It then emphasized that an authorized guardian may exer-
cise this right on behalf of an incompetent patient, but indicated that
no legal standards or guidelines governed the determination of this
issue.13 1
Thus, the court created its own version of a substituted judgment
test, holding that the crucial question was "whether Ronald, while
competent, sufficiently had evidenced his views, one way or the other,
to enable the court to determine, by clear and convincing evidence,
what [his] decision would be under the present circumstances."13 2
Before applying its test, however, the court carefully voiced its
reservations:
125. Id. at 206, 618 A.2d at 753.
126. Id. at 229-30, 618 A.2d at 765 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting).
127. See id. at 233, 618 A.2d at 767 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 233-34, 618 A.2d at 767 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting).
130. Mack, 329 Md. at 210-11, 618 A.2d at 755.
131. Id. at 212, 618 A.2d at 756.
132. Id. at 215, 618 A.2d at 758.
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[T]he "substitutedjudgment" label is a misnomer. The judg-
ment of the guardian is not accepted by the court in lieu of
the judgment of the ward. Rather, because the right is one
of self-determination, the inquiry focuses on whether the
ward had determined, or would determine, that treatment
should be withdrawn under the circumstances of the case.1 33
Applying this standard to the facts of Mack, the court first found
that Ronald had never explicitly made his views or preferences known
by executing a living will or durable power of attorney or by taking any
other definitive action."' The court then turned to evidence of Ron-
ald's lifestyle, religion, general system of values, and reactions to previ-
ous medical treatment.3 5 Finding this evidence to be "conflicting,"
the court concluded that it did not satisfy the "clear and convincing"
threshold of proof and upheld the circuit court's decision.13 6
After rejecting Deanna's request under a substituted judgment
analysis, the majority considered and rejected an application of the
best interest test."3 7 The court reasoned that because Ronald's intent
was unknown, a conclusion that it was in his best interest to die would
be based entirely on his physical condition. 13 8 Such a holding, the
court continued, would set a precedent for withholding artificially ad-
ministered sustenance from every patient in a persistent vegetative
state who had never expressed views explicit enough to satisfy the
clear and convincing standard of proof. 9 The court warned that this
"unworthy" life standard could thereafter expand until it encom-
passed the lives of the handicapped, the retarded, and others, in a
"logical progression" reminiscent of Nazi Germany.1 40
In justifying its refusal to apply a best interest test, the court
pointed to its perception that public consensus had not yet crystallized
enough to definitively answer questions regarding the quality of life of
133. Id. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757.
134. Id. at 215, 618 A.2d at 757.
135. Id. at 217, 618 A.2d at 758. The court wrote: "The scope of the evidence that may
be received in the inquiry is as wide as the concepts of relevance and materiality are to the
state of mind issue." Id. at 215, 618 A.2d at 758. "The patient's 'philosophical, religious
and moral views, life goals, values about the purpose of life and the way it should be lived,
and attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and death' should be ex-
plored." Id. (quoting Stephen A. Newman, Treatment Refusals for the Critically and Terminally
Ill: Proposed Rulesfor the Family, the Physician, and the State, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANNUAL
35, 47 (1985)).
136. Id. at 198, 618 A.2d at 749.
137. Id. at 217-22, 618 A.2d at 759-61.
138. Id. at 218, 618 A.2d at 759.
139. Id. at 221, 618 A.2d at 761.
140. Id. at 221 n.ll, 618 A.2d at 761 n.l1.
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patients in a persistent vegetative state.14' As the court explained,
"[w] here the values themselves are in a state of flux in society, a legisla-
tive body is better equipped to determine, within constitutional limits,
whether some lives are not worth living and, if so, how to determine
which are the lives that are not worth living."142 Thus, the court not
only refrained from applying any test that would require a "quality of
life" judgment, 43 but also indicated its intention to continue to do so
until it received clear guidance from the legislature.1 44
In his dissent, Judge McAuliffe agreed with the majority that the
term "substituted judgment" was a misnomer.'45 The true question,
he reasoned, is "what the ward would wish done under the present
circumstances.' 46 Judge McAuliffe considered numerous factors in
answering this question, including Ronald's previous reactions to the
medical care of others, his values, and his attitude toward health care
professionals and institutions. 47 The strongest influence on Judge
McAuliffe's determination, however, was Ronald's prognosis. 148 The
patient, McAuliffe argued, was not "alive" in the traditional sense; he
was permanently unconscious, incapable of thought or feeling, and
unable to perform any basic functions independently-including eat-
ing and breathing. 49 Because there was no reasonable hope of a cure
or remission during Ronald's lifetime, McAuliffe posited that "most
reasonable persons would elect to terminate this existence."15 0 He
141. Id. at 219-20, 618 A.2d at 760.
142. Id. at 219, 618 A.2d at 759-60.
143. See id. at 219-20, 618 A.2d 760.
144. Id. at 222, 619 A.2d at 761 ("Unless and until current public policy, as we perceive
it, is changed by the General Assembly, sustaining Ronald and other persons like him,
whose desires concerning the withdrawal of artificial sustenance cannot clearly be deter-
mined, is a price paid for the benefit of living in a society that highly values human life.").
145. Id. at 224, 618 A.2d at 762 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting) ("Semantics may be a part of
the problem here. 'Substituted judgment' is not a particularly apt term .. .
146. Id.
147. Id. at 225, 618 A.2d at 763 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). Judge McAuliffe created his
own substituted judgement standard:
If Ronald Mack, complete with his personality, predilections, philosophies, be-
liefs, and values were given competency for a day, and fully informed concerning
what had transpired, the condition and environment to which he would shortly
and permanently return, the beliefs and desires of his family members, and the
prognosis in his case, what decision would he make concerning the discontinu-
ance of artificially administered nutrition and hydration?
Id. at 225-26, 618 A.2d at 763 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 227, 618 A.2d at 763-64 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 226, 618 A.2d at 763 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). Ronald had a tracheostomy
to permit suctioning of lung secretions and a surgically implanted gastronomy tube for
nutrients. Id.
150. Id. at 227, 618 A.2d at 763-64 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
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concluded that absent evidence indicating that Ronald would prefer
to maintain any semblance of life, "it is not only permissible, but in-
deed necessary, to attribute to the ward the inclination or desire of an
ordinary, prudent person under the same circumstances... and to
give that factor the heavy weight it deserves .... ,,t15
Judge Chasanow concurred with the majority's decision to main-
tain treatment, but agreed with Judge McAuliffe's sentiment on the
patient's physical condition. He wrote that "it is doubtful that society
'highly values' life in a persistent vegetative state."1 52 In addition, he
stated that "'[s]ince [the Quinlan case], public opinion polls have re-
vealed an impressive shift of opinion in just one generation from a
majority opposed to "pulling the plug" on permanently comatose pa-
tients to a large majority-sometimes nearing 90%-in favor of such
measures."'" 53 He also noted that this view dominates current writings
on medical ethics.154 In light of this evidence, Judge Chasanow as-
serted that judicial intervention should be unnecessary when health
care providers and people close to the patient unanimously agree to
terminate treatment. 5 Only when family members and health care
providers differ in opinion, he urged, must treatment be continued
absent clear evidence of the patient's previous views to the contrary. 15 6
151. Id. at 228, 618 A.2d at 764 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 236, 618 A.2d at 768 (Chasanow,J., concurring and dissenting).
153. Id. at 236-37, 618 A.2d at 768 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting
Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REv. 857, 860
(1992)).
154. Judge Chasanow wrote:
[T]he textbook, Clinical Ethics, has been used for the mandatory course in medical
ethics at the University of Maryland School of Medicine for the last four years. In
discussing when it is "ethically permissible" to discontinue respiratory support,
that textbook states: "(1) ... [T]he state of an irreversible loss of human cognitive
and communicative function implies that a 'person' no longer exists in any signif-
icant sense of the term .... (2) As a result, no goals of medicine other than
support of organic life are being or will be accomplished. We do not believe this
goal, in and of itself, is an independent and overriding goal of medicine. (3)
[The benefit of keeping the patient alive is questionable] when the patient now,
and never will, be able to appreciate what is being done for him or her. (4) No
preferences of the patient are expressed or known. The conjunction of these
four factors justifies, in our judgment, a decision not to continue medical inter-
vention ....
Id. at 237, 618 A.2d at 769 (Chasanow,J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting ALBERT R.
JONSEN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS: A PRACTnCAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISIONS IN CLINICAL
MEDICINE 106-07 (2d ed. 1986)).
155. Id. at 239-41, 618 A.2d at 769-70 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting)
("Where an incompetent patient is in a persistent vegetative state or is terminally ill and
there is no designated guardian, then those closest to the patient, if unanimous, should be
able to make the decision to terminate life support without judicial intervention.").
156. Id. at 241, 618 A.2d 770-71 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Acknowledging the family dispute before the court, Judge Chasa-
now then turned to the task of discerning Ronald's intent. He es-
chewed the "substituted judgment" and "best interest" labels in favor
of the more encompassing term "surrogate judgment."" 7 He con-
cluded that the key in this analysis is whether "the surrogate decision
maker believe[s], and ha[s] an adequate basis for believing, that this
patient, if suddenly and miraculously given the ability to express a
preference, would choose to terminate life support."' This decision
allowed relatives of infants and individuals who had never been com-
petent to discontinue treatment if they firmly believed the patient
would make that decision if competent.'59
An overriding theme of Judge Chasanow's surrogate judgment
analysis was the great discretion given to individuals close to the pa-
tient in setting the course of treatment."6 He emphasized the inher-
ent problems in constructing an incompetent patient's likely decision
and submitted that the lesser of all evils requires strong reliance on
the opinions of those "who best knew the patient." '6 He afforded the
opinions of these individuals considerable force, to the extent that
they alone could satisfy the "clear and convincing" standard of proof
required in determining an incompetent patient's intent. 6 '
Judge Chasanow recognized that situations may continue to arise
in which family members offer conflicting opinions. 6 ' In these in-
stances, he conceded that "[m]easuring contrasting opinions against
the objective criteria of the best interests test may aid the court in
resolving the conflict."' 64 He refused, however, to presume that pa-
tients in a persistent vegetative state would choose, as suggested by the
majority opinion, to continue life-sustaining medical treatment absent
157. Id. at 242-48, 618 A.2d at 771-74 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting).
158. Id. at 245, 618 A.2d at 773 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis
added).
159. See id. at 245, 618 A.2d at 772-73 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting).
160. Id. at 247, 618 A.2d at 774 (ChasanowJ., concurring and dissenting) ("If a decision
is to be made, then the patient's probable decision can best be determined by those closest
to the patient rather than by a legislature or a judge.").
161. Id. at 243, 618 A.2d at 772 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting).
162. Id. at 242, 618 A.2d at 771 (Chasanow,J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Chasa-
now set forth the types of evidence that should be considered in determining an incompe-
tent patient's intent, ranked in the following order of priority: (1) legal documents; (2)
relevant statements made by the patient; (3) opinions of people close to the patient; and
(4) "the patient's attitude towards medical treatment, ethical, religious, and moral views,
life goals, etc." Id. Of these categories, only the first three types of evidence would meet
the "clear and convincing" standard of proof; evidence in the fourth category would be
admitted only to provide additional support. Id.
163. Id. at 246 n.3, 618 A.2d at 773 n.3 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting).
164. Id.
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clear evidence to the contrary. 165 He therefore concluded that "[the
circuit court] was correct in ruling that Ronald's gastrostomy tube
should not be removed because (1) Ronald had never clearly evi-
denced his views on the subject and (2) the two family members clos-
est to him differed in their sincere beliefs as to what Ronald would
have wanted."' 66
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE AM4CK DECISION
Although the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment is
an inherently personal concern, state courts have been forced to cre-
ate formal legal structures to guide the decisionmaking process. De-
spite the significant progress courts have made in this area, cases
continue to arise and increase in number and complexity. Mack, for
example, combined the issues of guardianship, interstate patient
transfers, family disputes, and medical treatment for patients in a per-
sistent vegetative state. The disagreement among the judges on the
Mack court illustrates the difficulty in answering the questions posed
in such cases.
A. Separating the Determination of Guardianship from the
Treatment Issue
The small foundation of Maryland law guiding the Mack court on
the guardianship issue dictated that opinions of contesting family
members regarding medical treatment were inappropriate to consider
in an initial guardianship determination. Former section 13-708(c) of
the Estates and Trusts Article, which required that a previously ap-
pointed guardian obtain court approval to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, however, gave the courts authority to address
the treatment issue after a guardian had been appointed. 6 7 As the
majority noted, because Deanna Mack acknowledged that she needed
additional court approval to discontinue Ronald's treatment, her
views were consistent with the governing Maryland statutory
scheme. 6 ' The judicial supervision requirement also rendered Judge
Chasanow's fears over Deanna's "intent and apparent ability" to with-
draw the treatment unfounded.' 69 Although Deanna may have had
the intent to discontinue her husband's treatment, Maryland statutory
165. See id. at 251, 618 A.2d at 775 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting).
166. Id. at 769.
167. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c) (1991) (amended 1992); see supra text
accompanying note 29 (quoting § 13-708(c)).
168. Mack, 329 Md. at 205-06, 618 A.2d at 753.
169. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
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law did not authorize her to take this course of action independently,
either within the state or by moving Ronald to Florida.1 70 In reality,
therefore, she had no "apparent ability" to withdraw treatment. Thus,
the Court of Appeals wisely determined that Deanna's views on medi-
cal treatment alone did not constitute good cause to disregard her
statutory priority to become guardian, 171 and it took the appropriate
action by vacating the circuit court's guardianship determination. 172
In his dissent, Judge Chasanow emphasized Mr. Mack's geo-
graphic proximity to the patient, his regular visits, and Deanna Mack's
living and having a third child with another man.7 - However, none
of these facts were analyzed, and the last two were not even men-
tioned, in the circuit court opinion, which instead "center[ed] on the
conflict over whether artificial hydration and nourishment should be
withdrawn." 174 Judge Chasanow did not address Deanna's efforts to
care for her husband both before and after his accident or the fact
that Mr. Mack could not explain numerous entries in his son's medi-
cal record that cast doubt on his claim that he visited his son fre-
quently. 75 With respect to Deanna's actions, evidence adduced at
trial showed that she visited her husband four to five times per week
during his first year of hospitalization. 176 She continued to visit her
husband several times a year after she moved to Florida, often bring-
ing their children.'" Moreover, she never divorced her husband,
even though this course of action would have been financially advan-
tageous to her.178 Thus, Judge Chasanow's claim that the facts clearly
and unambiguously compelled as a matter of law the selection of the
patient's father as guardian is easily controvertible.
Finally, the Mack majority also emphasized that case law required
that a best interest test be applied in every guardianship determina-
tion.' 79 On first impression, this requirement may appear to conflict
170. See MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-708(a) (2) & (c) (1991) (amended 1992).
Section 13-708(a)(2) provides that a guardian must obtain permission for a change in
abode, and § 13-708(c) requires court permission before withdrawing life-sustaining treat-
ment. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 29.
171. Mack, 329 Md. at 197-98, 618 A.2d at 749.
172. See id. at 204, 618 A.2d at 752.
173. Id. at 234-35, 618 A.2d at 767 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting).
174. In re Mack, No. 91-T-103, slip op. at 9 (Cir. Ct. for Baltimore County Mar. 10, 1992)
(mem.).
175. Brief of Appellant at 7, Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993) (No. 92-
99).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Mack, 329 Md. at 203, 618 A.2d at 752.
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with the court's opinion as a whole: because the court refused to con-
duct a best interest analysis in its determination of whether to allow
the withdrawal of Ronald's life-sustaining treatment, it would seem in-
consistent to mandate a best interest analysis as part of the guardian-
ship decision. As the court explained, however, guardianship
determinations are made independently from decisions regarding
life-sustaining treatment.'80 Thus, the guardianship best interest test
does not necessarily impact medical treatment decisions. The factors
listed by the majority to be considered with respect to the guardian-
ship appointment-whether Deanna would or could fulfill her guardi-
anship duties, and the relevance of Mr. Mack's geographic
proximity-are consistent with the type of factors traditionally consid-
ered in guardianship determinations; they are focused on the guard-
ian's personal character and ability to carry out the required duties.' 8 '
A consideration of the ward's prognosis, the crux of a medical treat-
ment best interest test, was noticeably absent from the factors the ma-
jority mentioned as a part of the Maryland "best interest" test.18 2
Thus, although the two analyses share a common name, the Mack de-
cision demonstrated that they are fundamentally different and do not
necessarily impact one another.
B. The Decision Concerning Life-Sustaining Treatment
In Mack, the members of the court expressed reservations over
labeling the test it applied as a "substituted judgment" test.' A brief
review of state case law proves these reservations to be well-
founded." 4 The objective of the test is not simply to allow the guard-
ian to substitute his or her judgment for that of the ward; rather, nu-
merous factors must be weighed to discern what the patient would
have wanted under the circumstances. This test is not perfect as some-
times these elements are lacking, or as Mack demonstrates, two people
who apparently knew the patient well can establish conflicting patient
preferences from similar sets of factors.
The "best interest" label is even more problematic. There is no
objective truth to guide the determination of an incompetent pa-
tient's best interest because every individual holds a unique personal
180. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
181. See Mack, 329 Md. at 204, 618 A.2d at 752.
182. See id.
183. See supra notes 133, 145 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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opinion as to the value of life."' 5 Because the best interest test does
not emphasize the personal sentiments of the ward, attempts to define
precisely a ward's best interest are reduced to an application of the
decisionmaker's values and opinions."8 6 The question then becomes
who should be the decisionmaker. As the Mack decision demon-
strated, this question is not always easily answered.
The statutes governing the Mack decision were insufficient to as-
sist the court in resolving these difficulties. For example, Maryland
law did not expressly permit or forbid analysis of a guardian's decision
to terminate a ward's life-sustaining treatment under the best interest
test.1 7 Nevertheless, the fact that a guardian could not withdraw life-
sustaining treatment without judicial approval implied such a limita-
tion. 88 Under the law at the time of the decision, a validly appointed
guardian lacked the authority to carry out, without judicial approval,
what she deemed to be in her ward's best interest if that meant termi-
nating treatment.18 9 She could, however, elect to continue treatment
without judicial approval.19 0 Thus, Maryland law granted guardians
the authority to make only one choice independent of court supervi-
sion-a legal structure that could not grant a person who, theoreti-
185. Massachusetts implicitly recognized the inevitable differences of opinion that exist
on the personal issue of life-sustaining treatment in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986). In Brophy, the court honored a patient's choice to
terminate treatment but did not force the hospital, which objected on ethical grounds, to
take steps to withdraw treatment. Id. at 639. Instead, the court ordered the hospital to
assist the guardian in transferring the ward to a suitable facility. Id.
186. As Professor Tribe has explained,
The problem with any "objective" or "best interest" standard is that there is no
consensus in our society about how the value of a life is affected by the loss of
higher brain function, severe physical deterioration, or extreme pain. A best in-
terest approach for making a treatment decision imposes highly contested socie-
tal values paternalistically on the individual.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEmRCAN CONsTiTUrTIoNAL LAw § 15-11, at 1369 (2d ed. 1988) (em-
phasis in original) (citation omitted). For example, at least one court has based its best
interest test on the underlying assumption that the best interest of a patient requires medi-
cal providers to maintain whatever semblance of life is possible, even if part of the brain
has been removed. See In re Busalacchi, 1991 WL 26851, at *5 (Mo. CL App. 1991). At the
other extreme, a court that consistently values a patient's right to refuse medical treatment
above all else could ultimately be forced to legalize suicide. See TRIBE, supra, § 15-11, at
1366-67 (reasoning that if the patient's right to refuse medical treatment were always to
prevail, regardless of the prognosis, that standard would lead to the judicial approval of
suicide).
187. See MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-708 (1991) (amended 1992); see also supra
note 29 and accompanying text.
188. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c) (1991) (amended 1992).
189. See id.
190. See id.
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cally, knew the patient best the power to protect that patient's
autonomy in every situation.
Moreover, the Mack court feared that if it were to conduct a best
interest test and conclude that Ronald's best interest dictated that his
treatment be stopped, its decision would lead to the automatic with-
holding of artificially administered sustenance from all persons in a
persistent vegetative state who had not clearly and convincingly noted
a preference to the contrary.191 As decided, however, the Mack case, if
not for the legislature's immediate action, would have had the oppo-
site effect. The court's decision ultimately established that, when
faced with uncertainty as to patients' wishes, courts should mandate
that all patients in a persistent vegetative state be maintained in this
condition indefinitely.
While the state's concern over protecting its interest in human
life is both understandable and commendable, the standard created
in Mack no longer mirrors reality. As Judges Chasanow and McAuliffe
pointed out, most people today would not wish to live in a vegetative
state. 192 In honor of the premium placed on patient autonomy, it is
this sentiment against continuing treatment that normally should pre-
vail in cases involving PVS patients. Thus, although the Mack decision
comported with the confines of state statutory law, it did not reflect
the preferences of the public it was designed to protect.
V. THE HEALTH CARE DECISIONS Acr OF 1993
Three days after the Court of Appeals filed the Mack opinion,
several members of the Maryland legislature introduced the Health
Care Decisions Act of 1993.19 This law, which went into effect Octo-
ber 1, 1993, represents Maryland's attempt to provide a legal structure
to synthesize many of the complex issues posed in Mack. The Act cre-
ated a mechanism to identify the appropriate decisionmaker, which
can be an agent designated by the patient, a guardian, a family mem-
ber, or a friend,'94 and provides standards to guide that individual's
decisions.'95
The Act also addresses the weaknesses in Maryland's statutory law
that became apparent in Mack. A primary goal in setting the course of
191. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text.
193. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994). In addition, the Act
amended several sections of the Estates and Trusts Article. See MD. CODE ANN., Est. &
TRusTs § 13-601, §§ 13-707 to -708, §§ 13-711 to -713.
194. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (2) (1994).
195. Id. § 5-605(c); see infra note 217 and accompanying text (quoting the section).
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making medical treatment decisions for incompetent patients is to en-
sure that the choices made mirror those the individuals receiving care
would make.'96 Mack demonstrated that Maryland law granted guard-
ians, presumptively competent decisionmakers in positions to know
the would-be choices of their wards, little autonomy to make choices
regarding life-sustaining treatment on their behalf. One of the dan-
gers of enlarging the scope of a guardian's discretion, however, was
the possibility that incompetent wards will be left with little protection
in situations where protection may be needed. Thus, the drafters of
the new bill faced the challenge of granting guardians greater free-
dom from court supervision, while simultaneously guarding the state's
interest in protecting the lives of its citizens.
Mack also magnified the need to establish conclusively a standard
to guide the implementation of what has been called the substituted
judgment test, and to decide how-or whether-to implement a best
interest test in Maryland.' 97 In crafting these tests, the bill's drafters
again faced the delicate task of balancing patient autonomy against
the necessity of safeguarding the value of human life.
A. The Appointment and Powers of Guardians
The Health Care Decisions Act authorizes surrogate decisionmak-
ing for incompetent individuals who did not appoint an agent when
they were capable of doing so.'98 Like its predecessor, 199 the Act pro-
vides a hierarchy of individuals who have decisionmaking authority:
(i) a guardian for the patient, if one has been appointed;
(ii) the patient's spouse;
(iii) an adult child of the patient;
(iv) a parent of the patient;
(v) an adult brother or sister of the patient; or
196. See Mack, 329 Md. at 207, 618 A.2d at 753 (holding that a guardian must prove her
judgment matches her ward's).
197. See id. at 219, 618 A.2d at 760.61 (stating the court's refusal to apply a best interest
test).
198. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (a) (2) (1994) (setting forth the list of individ-
uals who may make a health care decision for an incompetent patient "who has not ap-
pointed a health care agent in accordance with th[e] subtitle").
199. The former law was § 20-107(d) of the Health-General Article. This section estab-
lished an ordered list of individuals who could consent to "furnishing medical or dental
care and treatment to a disabled individual" who had not executed a durable power of
attorney for medical care and for whom there was no "judicially appointed guardian, con-
servator, committee, or trustee who ha[d] the authority to consent to medical care." MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-107(d) (1990) (repealed 1993).
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(vi) a friend or other relative of the patient who meets the
requirements of paragraph (3) of this subsection. 20 0
To fully understand the revised Health Article, it must be read in con-
junction with corresponding changes made in the sections of the Es-
tates and Trusts Article addressing the powers of guardians. The
Attorney General has interpreted section 5-605(A)(2)(i) of the
Health-General Article to mean that the individual with the highest
priority, a previously appointed guardian, is the individual "to whom
the court has given power to consent to medical care under [section]
13-708(b) (8) of the Estates and Trusts Article." 20 ' Thus, only if a
guardian has not been given the power to consent to health care mat-
ters pursuant to section 13-708(b), may another surrogate make medi-
cal determinations on behalf of the patient.20 2
To comprehend the full scope of the authority that may be
granted to a guardian with respect to health care decisionmaking, one
200. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (2) (1994). This section provides addi-
tional safeguards when a designated decision maker is not a guardian or a member of the
patient's immediate family:
A friend or other relative may make decisions about health care for a patient
under paragraph (2) of this subsection if the person:
(i) is a competent individual; and
(ii) presents an affidavit to the attending physician stating:
1. that the person is a relative or close friend of the patient; and
2. specific facts and circumstances demonstrating that the person has
maintained regular contact with the patient sufficient to be familiar with the pa-
tient's activities, health, and personal beliefs.
Id. § 5-605(a) (3).
201. 78 Op. Att'y Gen. 114 (1993). Section 13-708 of the Estates and Trusts Article, and
its preceding provision, provides:
(a) In general-(1) The court may grant to a guardian of a person only those
powers necessary to provide for the demonstrated need of the disabled person.
(2) The court may appoint a guardian of the person of a disabled person for the
limited purpose of making one or more decisions related to the health care of
that person.
(b) Nonexclusive enumeration ofpermissible powers.-Subject to subsection (a) of this
section, the rights, duties, and powers which the court may order include, but are
not limited to:
(8) The power to give necessary consent or approval for:
(i) Medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment, or service,
including admission to a hospital or nursing home or transfer from one medical
facility to another;
(ii) Withholding medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment,
or service; and
(iii) Withdrawing medical or other professional care, counsel, treat-
ment, or service.
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708 (Supp. 1993).
202. See 78 Op. Att'y Gen. at 115.
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must look beyond section 13-708(b) of the Estates and Trusts Article
and consider section 13 -708(c), which was amended by the Health
Care Decisions Act and now provides in pertinent part:
(c) Medical Procedures.- (1) Notwithstanding the powers con-
ferred to a guardian under subsection (b) (8) of this section,
and except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, where a
medical procedure involves, or would involve, a substantial
risk to the life of a disabled person, the court must authorize
a guardian's consent or approval for:
(i) The medical procedure;
(ii) Withholding the medical procedure; or
(iii) Withdrawing the medical procedure that involves,
or would involve, a substantial risk to the life of the disabled
person.
(2) The court may, upon such conditions as the court con-
siders appropriate, authorize a guardian to make a decision
regarding medical procedures that involve a substantial risk
to life without further court authorization, if:
(i) The disabled person has executed an advance direc-
tive... that authorizes the guardian to consent to the provi-
sion, withholding or withdrawal of a medical procedure that
involves a substantial risk to life but does not appoint a
health care agent; or
(ii) The guardian is also the disabled person's spouse,
adult child, parent, or adult brother or sister.2 °3
Before the passage of the Health Care Decisions Act, the Attorney
General interpreted section 13-708(c), which did not include subsec-
tion (2) in its original form,2 °4 as granting a guardian the opportunity
to consent to life-threatening medical treatment only if the court ap-
proved. 2°5 No provision explicitly granted guardians the authority to
deny life-sustaining medical treatment, nor did the legislature provide
any avenues for a guardian to act independently of court supervision
when the issue of life sustaining treatment arose.20 6 Thus, the 1993
amendment significantly increased the autonomy of guardians and
the importance of their role.
Read in its entirety, the revised Estates and Trusts Article indi-
cates that the courts retain authority over supplying or denying life-
sustaining medical treatment to a ward, but if either of the two situa-
203. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-7 08(c) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added to indi-
cate amendments made by the Health Care Decisions Act).
204. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
205. See 75 Op. Att'y Gen. 27, 41 (1990).
206. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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tions described in section 13-708(c) (2) occur, the court may choose to
relinquish much of its power.20 7 The legislature has therefore crafted
a legal structure whereby "[t] he administration of guardianship affairs
remains subject to judicial control by the equity court that appointed
the guardian,"2 °8 while also providing a mechanism that makes it pos-
sible to grant a degree of autonomy to the guardian. When a guard-
ian obtains the authority to act independently of court supervision,
she must nonetheless operate within the confines of the Health-Gen-
eral and Estates and Trusts Articles, which set standards for surrogate
decisionmakers. °9
The new law also provides a means for resolving disputes among
parties of equal priority.210 If the patient is in a hospital or related
institution when such a dispute arises, the health care provider or sur-
rogate decisionmaker must refer the dispute to the institution's pa-
tient care advisory committee.2 1' If the patient is not in one of the
enumerated places, a physician may not withhold or withdraw life-sus-
taining procedures unless all of the surrogates with equal claim to
decisionmaking authority unanimously agree to do so. 2 1 2 The new
law does not provide a mechanism whereby parties who do not have
statutory priority may attempt to influence the course of the patient's
treatment.
213
207. See 78 Op. Att'y Gen. 114, 117-18 (1993).
208. Id. at 115 (quoting Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 201, 618 A.2d 744, 751 (1993)); see
also Kircherer v. Kircherer, 285 Md. 114, 118, 400 A.2d 1097, 1100 (1979).
209. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c) (1994); MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS
§ 13-708(c) (Supp. 1993). For standards for surrogate decision makers, see infra note 217
and accompanying text.
210. The bill is also sensitive to the personal values of health care providers, allowing
them to transfer patients when they are morally opposed to a patient's wishes. See MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611 (1994).
211. See id. § 5-605(b)(1).
If persons with equal decision making priority under subsection (a) of this section
disagree about a health care decision, and a person who is incapable of making
an informed decision is receiving care in a hospital or related institution, the
attending physician or an individual specified in subsection (a) of this section
shall refer the case to the institution's patient care advisory committee, and may
act in accordance with the recommendation of the committee ....
Id.
212. See id. § 5-605(b) (2).
213. See id, § 5-605(a) (2) ("Individuals in a particular class may be consulted to make a
decision only if all individuals in the next higher class are unavailable.").
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B. Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment
In response to the need for guidelines to cover whatJudge Chasa-
now referred to as "surrogate judgments," 14 the Health Care Deci-
sions Act addresses the "quintessentially legislative "215 question of
when discontinuing life-sustaining medical treatment may be appro-
priate. First, the surrogate must apply a subjective "substituted judg-
ment" test to discern the personal preferences of the patient.2 16 This
test includes the by-now familiar elements a surrogate must consider
when making decisions on behalf of a patient. They are: (1) diagno-
sis/prognosis; (2) previously expressed preferences regarding the
medical treatment at issue or other treatment generally; (3) religion,
values, and moral beliefs; (4) past behavior or other manifestations of
attitude toward the procedure at issue or health care decisions gener-
ally; (5) reactions to life-sustaining medical treatment of others; and
(6) expressed concerns over the treatment's psychological effect on
family and friends.217
If the wishes of a patient are unknown or unclear, the surrogate
decisionmaker may base her decision regarding life-sustaining treat-
ment on the patient's best interest.218 The best interest test includes a
consideration of the following factors:
214. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 242-48, 618 A.2d 744, 771-74 (1993) (Chasanow, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
215. Id. at 222, 618 A.2d at 761.
216. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c) (1994); see also MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 13-711 (d) (1993) (setting forth the same substituted judgment test in the Estates
and Trusts Article).
217. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c) (1994). The provision reads in full:
(c) Standards for surrogates.-(1) Any person authorized to make health care deci-
sions for another under this section shall base those decisions on the wishes of
the patient and, if the wishes of the patient are unknown or unclear, on the pa-
tient's best interest.
(2) In determining the wishes of the patient, a surrogate shall consider the
patient's:
(i) Current diagnosis and prognosis with and without the treatment at issue;
(ii) Expressed preferences regarding the provision of, or the withholding or
withdrawal of, the specific treatment at issue or of similar treatments;
(iii) Relevant religious and moral beliefs and personal values;
(iv) Behavior, attitudes, and past conduct with respect to the treatment at
issue and medical treatment generally;
(v) Reactions to the provision of, or the withholding or withdrawal of, a
similar treatment for another individual; and
(vi) Expressed concerns about the effect on the family or intimate friends of
the patient if a treatment were provided, withheld, or withdrawn.
Id.
Section 13-711 of the Estates and Trusts Article sets forth the same test for application
in the guardianship context. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-711(d) (1993).
218. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(1) (1994).
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(1) The effect of the treatment on the physical, emo-
tional, and cognitive functions of the individual;
(2) The degree of physical pain or discomfort caused to
the individual by the treatment, or the withholding or with-
drawal of the treatment;
(3) The degree to which the individual's medical condi-
tion, the treatment, or the withholding or withdrawal of
treatment, result in a severe and continuing impairment of
the dignity of the individual by subjecting the individual to a
condition of extreme humiliation and dependency;
(4) The effect of the treatment on the life expectancy of
the individual;
(5) The prognosis of the individual for recovery, with
and without the treatment;
(6) The risks, side effects, and benefits of the treatment
or the withholding or withdrawal of the treatment; and
(7) The religious beliefs and basic values of the patient
receiving treatment, to the extent these may assist the deci-
sionmaker in determining best interest." 9
When a guardian does not have authority to make health care
decisions for a ward pursuant to section 13-708(b) of the Estates and
Trusts Article, she must apply to the court to withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining treatment.122 In this situation, the court, using the sub-
stituted judgment factors, must find "clear and convincing" evidence
of the patient's intent before allowing a guardian to act.22 1 If no such
evidence is found, the court may resort to a best interest test.2 22 The
"best interest" of a patient in this context is defined as the point at
which the benefits to the individual resulting from the treatment out-
weigh its burdens and is virtually identical to the best interest test dis-
cussed above and set forth in section 5-601(e) of the Health-General
Article. 2
For the most part, there is nothing surprising about Maryland's
new substituted judgment or best interest tests. They are essentially a
formalization of the various factors that have been considered in
219. Id. § 5-601(e).
220. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRuSrS § 13-708(b), (c) (3) (1993) (establishing that a
guardian without authority to make decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment must ob-
tain court authorization to make such decisions).
221. Section 13-712(b) of the Estates and Trusts Article states that "[t] he court may make
a substituted judgment ... only on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the
disabled person would, if competent, decide to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining pro-
cedure under the circumstances." Id. § 13-712(b).
222. See id. § 13-711(b).
223. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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other jurisdictions in cases involving the issue of life-sustaining
treatment.
224
The Health Care Decisions Act also includes numerous safe-
guards to protect against the gradual devaluation of human life feared
by the Mack majority. First, the Act expressly prohibits mercy killing
and euthanasia.22 5  Second, surrogate decisions involving life-sus-
taining treatment may not be "based, in whole or in part, on either a
patient's preexisting, long-term mental or physical disability, or a pa-
tient's economic disadvantage." 226 Third, a surrogate may withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in three situations only:2 27 when
the patient is terminally ill, 228 in a persistent vegetative state,2 29 or is
suffering from an "end-stage" condition.23 ° In addition, some type of
physician certification is required in all of these circumstances prior
to providing, withholding, or withdrawing medical treatment.23 ' Fi-
224. But see Diane E. Hoffmann, The Mayland Health Care Decisions Act: Achieving the
Right Balance?, 53 MD. L. REv. 1064, 1092-94 (1994) (discussing some of the factors unique
to Maryland's test).
225. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611 (c) (1994). The law also strictly prohibits
surrogates from authorizing sterilization and treatment for mental disorders. See iL § 5-
605(d).
226. Id. § 5-605(c) (3).
227. See 78 Op. Att'y Gen. 110 (1993).
228. A "terminal" condition is an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness
which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, makes death imminent and from
which, despite the application of life-sustaining procedures, there can be no recovery. MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(q) (1994).
229. "Persistent vegetative state" is defined as
a condition caused by injury, disease, or illness:
(1) In which a patient has suffered a loss of consciousness, exhibiting no
behavioral evidence of self-awareness or awareness of surroundings in a learned
manner other than reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned
response; and
(2) From which, after the passage of a medically appropriate period of time,
it can be determined, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that there can
be no recovery.
Id. § 5-601 (o).
230. "End-stage condition" is defined as
an advanced, progressive, irreversible condition caused by injury, disease, or
illness:
(1) That has caused severe and permanent deterioration indicated by incom-
petency and complete physical dependency; and
(2) For which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, treatment of the
irreversible condition would be medically ineffective.
Id. § 5-601(i).
231. Section 5-606 provides:
(a) Certification of incapaity.-(1) Prior to providing, withholding, or with-
drawing treatment for which authorization has been obtained or will be sought
under this subtitle, the attending physician and a second physician, one of whom
shall have examined the patient within 2 hours before making the certification,
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nally, a medical provider also may petition a hospital's patient care
advisory committee or file a petition in court if she believes that "an
instruction to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining procedure from
the patient is inconsistent with generally accepted standards of patient
care."
2 3 2
CONCLUSION
In Mack, the Baltimore County Circuit Court granted guardian-
ship of a young adult male in a persistent vegetative state to his father,
dismissing the original grant made to his spouse.2 ss The court justi-
fied its decision by finding that his wife's desire to discontinue medi-
cal treatment was contrary to Maryland law and, therefore, sufficient
to overrule her statutory priority. 23 4 In actuality, however, Maryland
law on this issue had yet to be created. Within days of the Court of
Appeals's responses to the lower court, in which it remanded the case
on the issue of the wife's guardianship but denied her request to end
her husband's life support absent a clear and convincing indication of
his intent,23 5 the Maryland General Assembly addressed the need for
legal structure in this relatively new area of the law. The resulting
Health Care Decisions Act removed the authority for making certain
medical decisions from the courts, clarified guardianship appoint-
shall certify in writing that the patient is incapable of making an informed deci-
sion regarding the treatment. The certification shall be based on a personal ex-
amination of the patient.
(2) If a patient is unconscious, or unable to communicate by any means, the
certification of a second physician is not required under paragraph (1) of this
subsection.
(b) Certification of condition.-A health care provider may not withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining procedures on the basis of an advance directive where no
agent has been appointed or on the basis of the authorization of a surrogate,
unless:
(1) The patient's attending physician and a second physician have certified
that the patient is in a terminal condition or has an end-stage condition; or
(2) Two physicians, one of whom is a neurologist, neurosurgeon, or other
physician who has special expertise in the evaluation of cognitive functioning,
certify that the patient is in a persistent vegetative state.
Id. § 5-606.
232. See id. § 5-612(a). A patient's spouse, parent, adult child, grandchild, brother, sis-
ter, friend or other relative qualified as a surrogate under § 5-605 may also petition the
court to enjoin, withdraw, or withhold treatment. See id. § 5-612(b). The court may do so
upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the action is not authorized by
law. Id.
233. Mack, 329 Md. at 196, 618 A.2d at 748.
234. Id.; see supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
235. Mack, 329 Md. at 197-98, 618 A.2d at 749; see supra note 116 and accompanying
1342 [VOL. 53:1306
1994] GuARDIANs' AUTHORITY TO REFUSE TREATMENT 1343
ment standards, and formalized the elements of substituted judgment
and best interest determinations. It was an appropriate and timely
response to the issues introduced in Mack and other state court deci-
sions. The Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 will provide the neces-
sary guidance to steer Maryland courts in the life-sustaining treatment
cases that inevitably will arise in the future.
